Country: Cambodia

Years: 1953-1969

Leader: Sihanouk

Ideology: leftist

Description: While V-Dem’s identifies Leng Ngeth as prime minister at the end of 1955, World Statesmen (2019) and Rulers.org identify Sihanouk as prime minister from October 3 to January 4, 1956.  HoG does not identify ideology. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Sihanouk’s party affiliation as Sangkum Reastr Niyum/Popular Socialist Community (SRN) at that time. Salem Press Biographical Encyclopedia identifies SRN and Sihanouk as leftist, writing “Abdicating the throne to his father in 1955, Sihanouk soon founded the Sangkum Reastre Niyum (people’s socialist community), which was designed to spread his own mix of capitalist and Marxist elements in what he liked to call a unique form of “Buddhist socialism.” Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective monde (2019) identifies Sihanouk as SRN and ideology of SRN as center: “Prince Norodom Sihanouk | 1955 (3 octobre) | 1956 (5 janvier) | Communauté socialiste populaire | [Nul] | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Centre].” World Statesmen (2020) identifies SRN as leftist, writing “SRN = Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community, nationalist, Buddhist socialism, anti-communist, 1955-1970).” CHISOLS identifies Sihanouk’s party as FUNK.

Years: 1970-1974

Leader: Lon Nol

Ideology: Left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify party affiliation in 1969, and as none in 1970. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Nol’s party affiliation as none. Nohlen et al. identify his party affiliation as Social Republicans after 1972, writing that “The 1972 elections were boycotted by the opposition, and all seats went to Lon Nol's Social Republicans.” Manzano (2017) identifies Nol’s ideology as left. Perspective monde (2019) identifies affiliation of Nol as SRN and ideology of SRN as center: “Lon Nol | 1969 (14 août) | 1971 (6 mai) | Communauté socialiste populaire | | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Centre].” World Statesmen (2020) identifies SRN as leftist, writing “SRN = Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community, nationalist, Buddhist socialism, anti-communist, 1955-1970).” In V-Party (2020), 5 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Right” (2.223) in 1972. Slocomb (2006) writes “With Lon Nol's power now unchallenged, he 'developed grandiose ideas of building the Khmer Republic into a "Mon-Khmer" super-state'. The president presented his new state ideology in a booklet… According to the president, Neo-Khmerism would achieve socialism through nationalism, republican democracy and popular well-being, not with 'savage class struggle and sending monks to work in the ricefields'. Indochinese Communism was very destructive, he warned, and historical capitalism also entailed 'faults and errors'. Neo-Khmerism, on the other hand, was quintessentially Khmer but at the same time syncretic, 'fusing the spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity of Europe with the very deep influence of Buddha.”

Years: 1975-1978

Leader: Pol Pot

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as Communist Party of Kampuchea (KCP). DPI identifies KCP’s ideology as left. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on KCP’s ideology. Perspective monde (2019) identifies party affiliation of Pol Pot as KCP and ideology of KCP as left: “Pol Pot | 1976 (13 mai) | 1979 (7 janvier) | Parti communiste du Kamputchea | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Gauche communiste].” World Statesmen (2020) identifies Pol Pot’s party as KCP, and KCP’s ideology as leftist, writing “KCP = Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa (Communist Party of Kampuchea (known publicly as Angkar Loeu [High Organization] was actually Khmer Rouge, from 29 Sep 1977 officially announced to be Kampuchean Communist Party, only legal party 1976-79, Maoist communist, 1966-1981)”

Years: 1979-1984

Leader: Heng Samrin

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as Kampuf People’s Revolutionary Party (PRPK/KPRP). DPI identifies PRPK’s ideology as left. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on PRPK’s ideology. Perspective monde (2019) identifies party affiliation of Heng Samrin as PRPK/KPRP, and PRPK/KPRP’s ideology as left: “Heng Samrin | 1979 (7 janvier) | 1981 (27 juin) | Parti révolutionnaire populaire du Kamputchea | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Gauche communiste].” In V-Party (2020), 5 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Left” (-2.691) in 1981. Slocomb (2006) writes “For its first six years, the PRK [founded 1979] was an ideological state and while not all of the Party leaders - and even fewer of the state functionaries - understood the goals of the regime in terms of that ideology, certain key players were dedicated socialists”.

Years: 1985-1992

Leader: Hun Sen

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party

affiliation as Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (PRPK) until 1990 and as Cambodian People’s Party (KPK/CPP) afterwards. DPI identifies PRPK’s and KPK’s ideology as left. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on PRPK’s ideology. The Political Handbook of the World (2015) writes “The CPP was launched as a non-Communist successor to the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP)”, and “After abandoning Marxism-Leninism, the CPP at its 1991 founding congress supported the adoption of a multiparty system, endorsed a free-market economy, called for the designation of Buddhism as the state religion, and announced a number of structural and leadership changes.” Manzano (2017) identifies Hun Sen’s ideology as left. Perspective monde (2019) identifies party affiliation of Hun Sen as PRPK/KPRP, and PRPK/KPRP’s ideology as left: “Hun Sen | 1979 (7 janvier) | 1981 (27 juin) | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Gauche communiste].” World Statesmen identifies Hun Sen’s party as KPRP (renamed KPK in 1991), and identifies KPRP and KPK’s ideology as leftist, writing “KPRP = Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple Khmer (Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (Marxist-Leninist communist, anti-Khmer Rouge, pro-Vietnam, to 1981 named Cambodian Communist, only legal party 1981-91, in 1991 renounces communism, 1979-1991, renamed KPK)” and KPK = Kanakpak Pracheachon Kâmpuchéa (Cambodian People's Party, democratic-socialist, authoritarian, former KPRP, est.17 Oct 1991)”. In V-Party (2020), 5 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Left” (-2.691) in 1981 with “Virtually no visible disagreement”. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 9 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) as 5.2 with average divided-united (0-10) party score as 8.4. Slocomb (2006) writes “Early leaders of the PRK, trained in socialist theory and dialectic in Vietnam, believed they could revive the revolution by taking it back to 'genuine' Marxism Leninism. Their efforts had already failed some years before international socialism itself lost appeal as the ideology of a worldwide leftist movement. Immediately after taking executive power, Hun Sen used his position and his party status to effect sweeping changes to the administration in order to facilitate liberal economic reforms. These were pragmatic reforms; the PRK did not espouse capitalism or liberalism between 1985 and 1989, it simply discarded socialist economic practices… It is more reliable to name those ideologies that Hun Sen does not espouse than to attempt to label him with one. It is clear that he is not a proponent of liberal multi-party democracy and despite the repeated claims of his opponents to the contrary, he is not and never has been a Communist. Although he joined the forces of the Cambodian revolution in the late 1960s, everything that he has done in the public domain since coming to power in 1985 suggests that his impulse to join the revolution was idealistic rather than ideological… By abandoning ideology, Hun Sen may very well have broken the mould of brief, erratic reign which has dogged the leaders of post-independence Cambodia”. Ortiz de Zárate (2003) writes “Apart from these disturbing domestic political developments, Sen, who was taking Cambodia's immersion in private capitalism and the free market very seriously (so much so that allegations of rapacious exploitation of natural resources, the sale of state property at bargain prices and the installation of the crudest forms of corruption surfaced), embarked on a foreign opening operation which, with an eminently pragmatic criterion, namely, to develop trade and investment”. Erlanger (1989) writes “A military commander in the Khmer Rouge until 1977, the Hun Sen who now argues for private enterprise is at best a flexible pragmatist; at worst, a cynical charlatan.” Strangio (2014) writes “What role did Hun Sen play under the [communist] Khmer Rouge? In his early years he served the revolution enthusiastically, probably more so than he has since been willing to admit… According to Ben Kiernan’s research, Hun Sen left the city in 1967, and became a courier for insurgents in Memot district, close to his hometown in Kampong Cham, before “organizing a youth movement” against land seizures in 1969… As his international profile rose, Hun Sen moved to distance himself from his communist past. In the late 1980s he had emerged as one of the PRK’s most vocal advocates for economic liberalization and was a driving force behind the constitutional reforms of 1989. If the party didn’t bend, Hun Sen realized, it would break, like its counterparts in Eastern Europe. A carefully managed tack toward the center, on the other hand, had many benefits. It would win the regime sympathy in the West, and bolster the party’s political position ahead of the coming peace. A resurgent capitalism, Hun Sen argued in 1988, would help “develop the country, raise the standard of living of the people, and deprive the far right of a weapon.”… In Washington, Hun Sen had breakfast with George McGovern and former CIA head William Colby… in New York, [he] won over the editorial board of the *Wall Street Journal* by proclaiming his conversion to the free market creed… “All my life I regarded myself as a pragmatic person,” he told the *Washington Post* during his stop in the US capital. “I stayed under the so- called umbrella of Marxist- Leninism when I had to, but please don’t think everyone . . . who goes to church has the same beliefs.”” and “The story of Hunsenomics begins in the late 1980s, when the CPP cast off its communist trappings and began its “transition” to the free market. In reality, it was more of a sudden lurch, prompted by the abrupt cutoff of aid from the Soviet Union. Economic controls were abandoned overnight; state enterprises were sold off to politicians and cronies at a heavy discount… liberalization was pursued less for the sake of economic competition than as a way of thwarting political competition by transferring the economy into friendly hands. In June 1989 Hun Sen told a visiting Vietnamese delegation that privatization of state- owned enterprises was vital, “because if we leave them with the state, we will face problems when the three [opposition] parties come and spend money that belongs to our factories.” The logic was simple: enemies would be starved of funds; friends would be showered with gold”. Vickery (1994) states, “Since October 1991, Marxism-Leninism has been officially abandoned [by the PRK],” and “To support the social welfare provisions of the constitution, which are far more extensive and detailed than in any previous Cambodian Constitution, making Cambodia a truly ‘welfare state’ if implemented, the free market economy will have to be tightly supervised and subjected to heavy taxation. . . that is probably the goal of the technocrats and younger members of the CPP, who appear to be attaining dominance in the Party.”

Years: 1993-1996

Leader: Ranariddh

Ideology: right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as Cambodian People’s Party (KPK/CPP), but writes in its country profile that “The victory in the elections went to FUNCINPEC, a royalist party founded by Sihanouk in 1981 in 1993, it was led by Sihanouk’s son, Norodom Ranariddh.”. Perspective monde (2019) identifies party affiliation of Norodom Ranariddh as National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia/ Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif (FUNCINPEC) and ideology of FUNCINPEC as right: “Prince Norodom Ranariddh | 1993 (2 juillet) | 1997 (6 juillet) | Front national uni pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif | [Faible] | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Centre droit].” World Statesmen (2019) identifies party affiliation of Norodom Ranariddh as FUNCINPEC and ideology of FUNCINPEC as right: “21 Sep 1993 - 6 Jul 1997 Prince Norodom Ranariddh (s.a.) FUNCINPEC … FUNCINPEC = Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, Sihanouk's main political group, royalist, center-right, est.1981).” In V-Party (2020), 5 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.547) in 1993.

Years: 1997-2020

Leader: Hun Sen

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party affiliation as Cambodian People’s Party (KPK/CPP) until 2008 and does not identify party affiliation afterwards. DPI identifies KPK’s ideology as left. . The Political Handbook of the World (2015) writes “The CPP was launched as a non-Communist successor to the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP)”, and “After abandoning Marxism-Leninism, the CPP at its 1991 founding congress supported the adoption of a multiparty system, endorsed a free-market economy, called for the designation of Buddhism as the state religion, and announced a number of structural and leadership changes.” Manzano (2017) identifies Hun Sen’s ideology as left. Perspective monde (2019) identifies party affiliation of Hun Sen as KPK and ideology of KPK as center: “Hun Sen 1998 (30 novembre) | 2013 (24 septembre) | Parti populaire cambodgien | [Nul] | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Centre]” and “Hun Sen | 2013 (24 septembre) | Parti populaire cambodgien | [Faible] | [En fonction d'une décision du chef d'État ou du parlement] | [Centre]” World Statesmen (2020) identifies KPK as leftist, writing “30 Nov 1998 - Samdech Hun Sen (s.a.) KPK … KPK = Kanakpak Pracheachon Kâmpuchéa (Cambodian People's Party, democratic-socialist, authoritarian, former KPRP, est.17 Oct 1991).” In V-Party (2020), 5 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (-0.359) in 1993 with “Negligible visible disagreement”, as “Center” (0.206) in 1998 with “Negligible visible disagreement”, as “Center” (0.393) in 2003 with “Negligible visible disagreement”, and as “Center-right” (0.782) in 2008 and 2013 with “Virtually no visible disagreement”. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 9 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) as 5.2 with average divided-united (0-10) party score as 8.4. Schlager et al. (2006) write “The far left CPP is the main party and won just under 50 percent of the popular vote in the general elections in 2003… CAMBODIAN PEOPLE’S PARTY (CPP)… The CPP arose out of the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). In 1990 the party’s leaders decided to significantly change the party’s identity in expectation of the 1993 elections. The party adopted its new name, renounced Communism, and expressed full support for multiparty democracy in Cambodia.” Varieties of Democracy identifies party affiliation as Cambodian Peoples' Party / Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party. Slocomb (2006) writes “Early leaders of the PRK, trained in socialist theory and dialectic in Vietnam, believed they could revive the revolution by taking it back to 'genuine' Marxism Leninism. Their efforts had already failed some years before international socialism itself lost appeal as the ideology of a worldwide leftist movement. Immediately after taking executive power, Hun Sen used his position and his party status to effect sweeping changes to the administration in order to facilitate liberal economic reforms. 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